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1 Introduction
Location choices by households and firms are of interest to economists for numerous reasons,
ranging from the determinants of residential segregation patterns in cities to the design of
national tax policy. Given the discrete nature of such choices, they are typically modelled
by empirical researchers through McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit framework.1 The ap-
peal of this approach lies in its formal link between the theoretical objective function of a
representative location-seeking agent and the likelihood function of the empirical model.
Mostly out of a perception of greater computational ease, researchers have resorted to
Poisson count estimation as an alternative approach to the conditional logit.2 Guimaraes,
Figueiredo and Woodward (2003), henceforth GFW, have shown that, with purely location-
specific locational determinants or with determinants that are specific to locations and to
groups of agents, the conditional logit and Poisson estimators return identical parameter
estimates. In this sense, the two estimators are equivalent, and the rigorous link to the theory
offered by the conditional logit model therefore applies identically to the Poisson. This useful
result has already been applied widely in the location choice literature.3
We show that the identical coefficient estimates resulting from the two estimation strate-
gies in fact have fundamentally different economic implications. The conditional logit model
implies that the aggregate number of agents is fixed and that differences across locations affect
only the distribution of those agents across those locations. Hence, an additional agent at-
tracted to location j means one less agent among the other locations in the relevant set, i 6= j.
In the Poisson model, however, an additional agent attracted to location j has no impact
on the number of agents in the remaining locations and thus raises the aggregate number of
agents, summed across i and j, by one. Thus, the conditional logit model and the Poisson
model can be viewed as polar cases, with the former representing zero-sum reallocations of
firms or households across locations and the latter implying a positive-sum world.4
We also show that intermediate cases between these two extremes can be represented by
a nested logit model featuring a generic outside option. This approach returns the same
1For studies of firm location choices using the conditional logit approach, see, e.g., Carlton (1983), Head, Ries
and Swenson (1995), Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward (2000), Head and Mayer (2004), Crozet, Mayer
and Mucchielli (2004), and Devereux, Griffith and Simpson (2007). For corresponding studies of household
location chocies, see, e.g., Ellickson (1981), Quigley (1985), Nechyba and Strauss (1998), Schmidheiny (2006),
and Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007).
2See, e.g., Papke (1991), Becker and Henderson (2000), List (2001), Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward
(2004), and Holl (2004), for studies of firms’ location choices; and Flowerdew and Aitkin (1982) and Bo¨rsch-
Supan (1990) for studies of individual migration choices.
3Recent studies invoking the GFW equivalence result include Duranton, Gobillon and Overman (2006),
Bru¨lhart, Jametti and Schmidheiny (2007), Arzaghi and Henderson (2008), Davis and Henderson (2008), and
Coeurdacier, De Santis and Aviat (2009).
4For recent research on the cross-region effects of region-specific policies aimed at attracting firms, see, e.g.,
Greenstone and Moretti (2003), Chirinko and Wilson (2008), and Wilson (2009).
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parameter estimates as the two other estimators. The nested logit in fact can be written
as a linear combination of the conditional logit and Poisson models, with a single “rivalness
parameter” representing the closeness of the nested logit to the conditional logit (and thus
the distance from the Poisson). Conditional logit and Poisson elasticities mark the polar cases
and can therefore serve as boundary values in applied research.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we formally derive the commonalities
and differences among the conditional logit, Poisson and nested logit models. Empirical
implications and an illustration are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 The models
We denote agents with f = 1, ..., N and regions with j = 1, ..., J . For simplicity, we shall
frame our discussion in terms of corporate location decisions, and therefore relate to f as
“firms”.
Following GFW, we first assume the determinants of locational attractiveness to be purely
region specific, such that they affect all firms symmetrically (case A). The K observable
characteristics of each region are given by the (K×1) vector xj . We then relax this assumption,
and allow locational attractiveness to be region-industry specific (case B).
The random variable nj represents the count of firms in region j, whereas Nj denotes the
number of firms actually observed in region j. Analogously, the random variable n represents
the total number of firms, whereas N denotes the observed total number of firms.
2.1 Case A: industry-invariant locational determinants
2.1.1 Conditional logit
Suppose that firm f ’s profit in region j is determined by the linear model pifj = x′jβ + εfj ,
where β is a (K×1) vector of coefficients. Then, the conditional logit model is defined by the
assumption that the random term εfj is independent across f and j and follows an extreme-
value type 1 distribution. With this assumption, the probability that a given firm f chooses
region j rather than another region is given by
Pj|f = Pj =
ex
′
jβ∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ
, (1)
where
∑
j Pj|f = 1 for all f . Since locational characteristics xj are assumed here to affect all
firms symmetrically, this probability also represents the share of firms that will choose region
j.
3
The parameter β can be estimated by maximum likelihood. We can write the log likelihood
as
logL(β) =
J∑
j=1
Nj logPj =
J∑
j=1
Njx
′
jβ −
J∑
j=1
[Nj log(
J∑
i=1
ex
′
iβ)]. (2)
The conditional logit model implicitly assumes that the total number of firms n is given
and does not depend on the locational characteristics x. The expected number of firms in
region j, E(nj) is therefore simply
E(nj) = nPj = n
ex
′
jβ∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ
. (3)
The percentage change in the expected number of firms in region j, E(nj), with respect
to a unit change in the k-th locational characteristic of region j itself is given respectively by
the own-region semi-elasticity :
jj =
∂ logE(nj)
∂xjk
= (1− Pj)βk. (4)
Similarly, the percentage change in the expected number of firms in another region, E(ni 6=j),
with respect to a unit change in j’s k-th locational characteristic is given by the cross-region
semi-elasticity :
ij =
∂ logE(ni)
∂xjk
= −Pjβk. (5)
For simplicity, we shall henceforth refer to these and all subsequently presented semi-
elasticities as “elasticities”. Hence, all “elasticities” derived and calculated in this paper in
fact are semi-elasticities.
The own-region elasticity (4) shows that by enhancing its attractiveness a region will in-
crease its expected number of firms, and the cross-region elasticity (5) implies that one region’s
increased attractiveness to firms will reduce the number of firms choosing other regions: one
region’s gain is another region’s loss. Moreover, a simple comparison of the two elasticities
shows that small regions (in terms of Pj , the share of firms they host) are predicted by the
conditional logit model to find their own firm counts to be relatively elastic to changes in
their own locational characteristics, while not affecting firm counts in other regions as much
as large regions.
We now turn from the viewpoint of individual regions to an analysis of what the conditional
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logit model implies for the total number of firms among the J regions. By definition,
E(n) =
J∑
j=1
E(nj) = n = N. (6)
Hence, the expected total number of firms is equal to the observed total, N , irrespective
of regressors and parameters. This again shows the “zero sum” aspect of the conditional logit
model, where the implied problem is one of allocating an exogenously fixed number of firms
over a set of regions. It also follows logically that changes in the locational attractiveness of
individual regions will not affect the total number of firms. Formally, the elasticity of the
expected total firm count relative to a change in one of the K locational characteristics of any
particular region j is zero:
j =
∂ logE(n)
∂xjk
= 0.
2.1.2 Poisson
The Poisson estimator is based on the assumption that nj is independently Poisson distributed
with region-specific mean
E(nj) = eα+x
′
jβ. (7)
Here too, β can be estimated by maximum likelihood. We can write the concentrated log
likelihood as
logL(β) =
J∑
j=1
Njx
′
iβ −
J∑
j=1
[Nj log(
J∑
i=1
ex
′
iβ)]−
J∑
j=1
logNj !−N +N logN. (8)
When comparing this to (2), the point made by GFW is plain to see: the log likelihood
functions of the two models are identical up to a constant, and maximum likelihood estimation
therefore yields identical parameter estimates βˆ.
The expected share of firms in region j can be written as
Pj =
E(nj)∑J
i=1E(nj)
=
eα+x
′
jβ∑J
i=1 e
α+x′iβ
=
ex
′
jβ∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ
, (9)
which is exactly the same expression as (1), for the conditional logit model. This equivalence
lies at the heart of the GFW result:
Observation 1 (Guimaraes, Figueiredo andWoodward, 2003) The log likelihood func-
tions for the conditional logit and the Poisson model are identical up to a constant, and max-
imum likelihood estimation therefore yields identical parameter estimates βˆ.
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The elasticity of the expected number of firms in region j, E(nj), with respect to a change
in the k-th locational characteristic of region j itself, and by that of another region i 6= j, is
given respectively by the own-region elasticity
jj =
∂ logE(nj)
∂xjk
= βk (10)
and by the cross-region elasticity
ij =
∂ logE(ni)
∂xjk
= 0. (11)
Comparing these elasticities to their conditional-logit equivalents (4) and (5), we observe
the following differences.
Observation 2 The Poisson model implies more elastic responses by firm counts to given
changes in own-region characteristics than the conditional logit model.
Observation 3 Unlike in the conditional logit model, in the Poisson model, one region’s
change in locational attractiveness has no impact on the number of firms located among any
of the J − 1 other regions.
Hence, even though the estimated parameters βˆ will be invariant to the choice of model,
their implied predictions differ starkly. The conditional logit model implies a zero-sum allo-
cation process of a fixed number of firms over the J jurisdictions. In contrast, in the Poisson
model new firms are non-rivalrous, in the sense that adjustment to one regions’s locational
characteristics works not through changes in firm numbers among the J − 1 other regions
but from changes either in the supply of local entrepreneurship or in firms attracted from or
repelled to somewhere outside the considered set of J regions.
Moving again from the viewpoint of individual regions to an analysis of the model’s im-
plications for the total number of firms among the J regions, and using (7), we find that
E(n) =
J∑
i=1
E(ni) =
J∑
i=1
eα+x
′
iβ = eα
J∑
i=1
ex
′
iβ.
Comparing this expression with its conditional logit equivalent (6), we note that the
expected total number of firms is now not generally equal to the observed total number of
firms, N , but depends on the regressors and parameters.5 The Poisson model thus implies
that a change in a region’s locational attractiveness will affect the sum of firms active in the
5Note that the predicted total number of firms at the estimated coefficients and actual data corresponds to
the observed total of firms in the Poisson model just as it does in the conditional logit model. In symbols,
E(n|αˆ, βˆ) = N .
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J regions. Specifically, the elasticity of the expected total firm count with respect to a change
in one of the K locational characteristics of any particular region j is given by
j =
∂ logE(n)
∂xjk
=
ex
′
jβ∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ
βk =
E(nj)
E(n)
βk = Pjβk.6
Observation 4 In the Poisson model, an increase (decrease) in one region’s locational at-
tractiveness increases (decreases) the total of firms summed across the J regions. In the
conditional logit model, a change in one region’s locational attractiveness leaves the total of
firms summed across the J regions unchanged.
2.1.3 Nested logit
Observations 2, 3 and 4 show that the two models are the polar cases of a continuum of
relative adjustment margins, ranging from reallocations purely within the set of alternatives
considered (conditional logit) to reallocations purely between that set and some outside option
(Poisson). We now turn to a micro-founded approach that covers this whole continuum and
thus encompasses the polar cases.
Suppose that firms make two sequential choices. At the first stage, they choose between
locating in one of the J regions considered (which could stand for “domestic” regions) and an
outside option j = 0 (which could stand for locating “abroad” or for remaining inactive). At
the second stage, they pick one of the J regions. Like in the conditional logit model, firm f ’s
profit in region j > 0 is determined by a linear function of the region-specific characteristics
xj , such that pifj = x′jγ + νfj . Firm f ’s profit associated with the outside option is given
by pif0 = δ + νf0, where δ summarizes the exogenously fixed locational attractiveness of the
outside option. The stochastic term νf0 is assumed to follow a generalized extreme value
distribution as in McFadden (1978).7 This leads to a nested logit model with one degenerate
“nest” that includes j = 0 only and one other “nest” that includes all regions j > 0. This
two-stage structure assumes independence between νf0 and νfj for all j > 0, and non-negative
correlation
(
1− λ2) across νfj for all j > 0; where 0 < λ ≤ 1, sometimes called the “log-sum”
coefficient, measures the importance of the domestic nest as a whole relative to the outside
option.
In this setting, the probability that a particular firm f chooses the outside option j = 0
is given by
P0 =
eδ
eδ + (
∑J
j=1 e
x′jβ)λ
, (12)
6We define Pj ≡ E(nj)/E(n) 6= E(nj/n) in the Poisson model. Using this definition, Pj = ex′jβ/∑Ji=1 ex′iβ
in both the conditional logit and the Poisson model.
7The specific density function assumed over {0, J} is F (νf ) = exp
[
−(∑Jj=1 e−νfj/λ)λ − e−νf0].
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and the probability that it chooses a particular region j > 0 among the J regions of interest
is
Pj =
ex
′
jβ(
∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ)λ−1
eδ + (
∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ)λ
= Pj>0 · Pj|j>0,
where we reparametrize β = γ/λ. This implies that, unlike in the conditional logit, the esti-
mated regression parameters β̂ are not identical to the structural parameters of the underlying
profit function.
The choice probabilities Pj can be decomposed into (a) the probability of choosing any
of the J regions, Pj>0 = 1− P0, and (b) the probability of choosing a specific region j given
that the firm chooses to set up in one of the J regions,
Pj|j>0 =
ex
′
jβ∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ
. (13)
The parameter β can again be estimated by maximum likelihood. We can write the
concentrated log likelihood as
logL(β) =
J∑
j=1
Njx
′
iβ−
J∑
j=1
[Nj log(
J∑
i=1
ex
′
iβ)]+N0 log(N0)+N log(N)− (N +N0) log(N +N0),
where δ and λ cancel out when we substitute the first-order condition ∂ logL/∂δ = 0 into
L(β, δ, λ).8 N is the number of firms locating in any of the regions j > 0, and N0 is the
number of firms choosing the outside option j = 0. Note that β can be estimated without
observing N0.
Observation 5 The log likelihood functions for the conditional logit, the Poisson and the
nested logit model with a single outside option are identical up to a constant, and maximum
likelihood estimation therefore yields identical parameter estimates βˆ.
The ratio (13) is identical to its equivalents in the conditional logit and Poisson models,
(1) and (9). This correspondence among the three models lies at the heart of Observation 5,
which extends the GFW result to the nested logit case with a single outside option.
8This expression is obtained as follows:
logL(β, δ, λ) = N0 logP0 +
J∑
j=1
Nj logPj
= N0 log
(
eδ
eδ + (
∑J
i=1 e
x′jβ)λ
)
+
J∑
j=1
[
Nj log
(
ex
′
jβ(
∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ)λ−1
eδ + (
∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ)λ
)]
.
The first-order condition with respect to δ is ∂ logL/∂δ = N0 − (N + N0)eδ/[eδ + (∑Ji=1 ex′iβ)λ] = 0. The
estimated δˆ can therefore be expressed as a function of the estimated βˆ and λˆ: eδˆ = N0/N · (∑Ji=1 ex′iβ)λ.
When we substitute eδˆ in logL(β, δ, λ), λ also cancels out.
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The expected number of firms in region j > 0 is
E(nj) = (n+ n0)Pj = (n+ n0)
ex
′
jβ(
∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ)λ−1
eδ + (
∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ)λ
. (14)
The own-region elasticity of the expected number of firms, E(nj), relative to locational char-
acteristics is given by
jj =
∂ logE(nj)
∂xjk
= [1− Pj|j>0(1− λP0)]βk, (15)
and the cross-region elasticity is given by
ij =
∂ logE(ni)
∂xjk
= −Pj|j>0(1− λP0)βk. (16)
We can now compare the own- and cross-region elasticities of the three models. Simple
inspection of elasticities (4), (5), (10), (11), (15) and (16) leads to the following observation.
Observation 6 The nested-logit own-region and cross-region elasticities lie between their con-
ditional logit and Poisson counterparts.
Once more, we now move from the analysis of firm counts in individual regions to the
total number of firms that are active in the J regions. Using (14) and (12), we find that
E(n) = (n+ n0)
(
∑J
j=1 e
x′jβ)λ
eδ + (
∑J
j=1 e
x′jβ)λ
= (n+ n0)Pj>0.
The expected total number of firms active in the J regions is simply given by the share of
potential firms that decide to become active in one of those regions. As in the Poisson model,
the expected total number of firms is not generally equal to the observed total number of firms,
N , but depends on the regressors and parameters, including those for the outside option.9
The elasticity of the expected total firm count relative to a change in one of the K locational
characteristics of any particular region j is given by
j =
∂ logE(n)
∂xjk
=
λeδex
′
jβ(
∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ)−1βk
eδ + (
∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ)λ
= λP0Pj|j>0βk.
Observation 7 Like the Poisson, the nested logit model implies that a change in a region’s
locational attractiveness will affect the total of firms summed across the J regions.
Here, the responsiveness of the aggregate firm number is due to the effect on the decisions
9As in the Poisson and conditional logit models, the predicted total number of firms among the J regions
at the estimated coefficients and actual data corresponds to the observed total: E(n|βˆ, δˆ, λˆ) = N .
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Table 1: Comparing implied elasticities (case A)
Conditional Logit Nested Logit Poisson
jj =
∂ logE(nj)
∂xjk
(1− Pj|j>0)βk [1− Pj|j>0(1− λP0)]βk βk
ij =
∂ logE(ni)
∂xjk
−Pj|j>0βk −Pj|j>0(1− λP0)βk 0
j =
∂ logE(n)
∂xjk
0 λP0Pj|j>0βk Pj|j>0βk
Notes: Pj|j>0 = E(nj)/E(n), P0 = E(n0)/E(n+ n0)
taken by firms that would have chosen the outside option in the absence of a change in regional
attractiveness.
2.1.4 A synthesis of the three models
We can now pull together the salient features of the three models. First, we consider the
impact of a change in the attractiveness of an individual region on the number of firms in that
region and across the J − 1 remaining regions. Table 1 gathers the own-region, cross-region
and aggregate elasticities implied by the three models.
In order to compare these elasticities, we define ρ = 1 − λP0 which satisfies 0 ≥ ρ ≥ 1
under the standard nested logit assumption 0 < λ ≤ 1. We call ρ the rivalness parameter.
It allows us to write the nested logit elasticities as a linear combination of their conditional
logit and Poisson equivalents: nlogitjj = ρ
clogit
jj + (1 − ρ)Poissonjj , nlogitij = ρclogitij and nlogitj =
(1−ρ)Poissonj . The rivalness parameter therefore acts as a summary measure of the position of
the data generating process between the two polar cases, conditional logit (ρ = 1) and Poisson
(ρ = 0). One may think of ρ as capturing of the relative importance of the outside option: as
ρ → 0, competition among the J regions becomes unimportant relative to the weight of the
outside option, while with ρ→ 1, the outside option becomes negligible and any reallocations
have to occur within the set of the J regions.
We can also establish rankings of the elasticities implied by the three models. Provided
that β 6= 0, the ranking of own-region elasticities is (c.f. Observations 2 and 6)
|Poissonjj | > |nlogitjj | > |clogitjj | > 0,
while the ranking of cross-regions elasticities is just the reverse (c.f. Observations 3 and 6),
|clogitij | > |nlogitij | > |Poissonij | = 0.
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and the ranking of aggregate elasticities is again (c.f. Observations 4 and 7)
|Poissonj | > |nlogitj | > |clogitj | > 0.
2.2 Case B: industry-specific locational determinants
Consider now that we observe K characteristics xsj for every region j and industry s. Hence,
we again do not observe firm-specific regional attributes, but we now allow for these attributes
to differ across groups of firms, best thought of as industries. We maintain the notation xj
for the subset of locational determinants that are constant across industries. Furthermore,
njs is the number of firms in region j and industry s, ns is the observed number of industry-s
firms across all regions, n is the total number of firms, and N stands for the corresponding
observed firm count in the sample.
The grouped conditional logit model is given by the probability that a given firm f of
industry s chooses region j rather than another region:
Pj|f = Pj|s =
ex
′
sjβ∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ
,
where
∑
j Pj|f = 1. Pj|s is the probability for a particular firm to choose region j given that
the firm belongs to industry s.
The grouped Poisson model is given by
E(nsj) = eαs+x
′
sjβ,
where αs is an industry-specific constant.
Finally, the grouped nested logit model is given by the probability that a given firm f of
industry s chooses either the outside option j = 0,
P0|s =
eδs
eδs + (
∑J
j=1 e
x′sjγ/λ)λ
=
eδs
eδs + (
∑J
j=1 e
x′sjβ)λ
,
or a particular domestic region j > 0,
Pj|s =
ex
′
sjβ(
∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ)λ−1
eδs + (
∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ)λ
= Pj>0|s · Pj|j>0,s = (1− P0|s)Pj|j>0,s,
where δs is an industry-specific constant, and β = γ/λ. Pj>0|s = 1 − P0|s is the probability
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Table 2: Comparing implied elasticities (case B)
Conditional Logit Nested Logit Poisson
Region-industry specific regressor xsjk:
(a) ∂ logE(nsj)∂xsjk βk(1− Pj|j>0,s) βk[1− Pj|j>0,s(1− λP0|s)] βk
(b) ∂ logE(nsi)∂xsjk −βkPj|j>0,s −βkPj|j>0,s(1− λP0|s) 0
(c) ∂ logE(ns)∂xsjk 0 βkPj|j>0,sλP0|s βkPj|j>0,s
(d) ∂ logE(nj)∂xsjk βk(1− Pj|j>0,s)Ps|j βk[1− Pj|j>0,s(1− λP0|s)]Ps|j βkPs|j
(e) ∂ logE(ni)∂xsjk −βkPj|j>0,sPs|i −βkPj|j>0,s(1− λP0|s)Ps|i 0
(f) ∂ logE(n)∂xsjk 0 βkPs|jPjλP0|s βkPs|jPj|j>0
Region specific regressor xjk:
(g) ∂ logE(nj)∂xjk βk
∑S
s=1(1− Pj|j>0,s)Ps|j βk
∑S
s=1[1− Pj|j>0,s(1− λP0|s)]Ps|j βk
(h) ∂ logE(ni)∂xjk −βk
∑S
s=1 Pj|j>0,sPs|i −βk
∑S
s=1 Pj|j>0,s(1− λP0|s)Ps|i 0
(i) ∂ logE(n)∂xjk 0 βkPj
∑S
s=1(λP0|sPs|j) βkPj|j>0
Notes: Pj|j>0,s = E(nsj)/E(ns), P0|s = E(ns0)/E(ns + ns0), Ps|j = E(nsj)/E(nj). Ps|j is the
fraction of firms in industry s in a given region j.
that a given industry-s firm chooses any domestic region j > 0, and
Pj|j>0,s =
ex
′
sjβ∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ
(17)
is the probability that such a firm chooses a particular domestic region conditional on not
choosing the outside option.
As in case A, the three models are observationally equivalent in a cross section of domestic
firm choices and yield identical estimates for the parameter vector β. This has been shown
by GFW for the grouped conditional logit and the grouped Poisson models, and we show it
in the Appendix for the grouped nested logit model.
Table 2 summarizes the implied elasticities in the three grouped models (see the Ap-
pendix for derivations). As in case A, the elasticities in the grouped nested logit model
are (industry-specific) linear combinations of their conditional logit and Poisson equivalents:
nlogit.. = ρs
clogit
.. + (1− ρs)Poisson.. where ρs = 1− λP0|s.
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3 Estimation
3.1 Elasticity bounds
We have shown that estimation of any of the three models will yield identical parameter es-
timates β̂. The additional parameters λ, δ and α in the nested logit model are not identified
but irrelevant for the estimation of β. Hence, it is impossible to discriminate formally between
these three model based on cross-section data. And yet, the implied elasticities differ sub-
stantially. In previous research, reported elasticities were based either on the conditional logit
model or the Poisson model, without justification of the particular choice made or, mistakenly
in this respect, by referring to the equivalence of the two models as established by GFW.
What can researchers do if they are not willing to make this choice by assumption but
rely on cross-sectional data? We propose in this situation that one calculate the elasticities
of both the conditional logit and the Poisson model and report these predictions as bounds
for the true effects. As shown in Observation 6, intermediate values can be rationalized by a
nested logit model.
The computation of both conditional logit and Poisson elasticities requires that one calcu-
late predicted probabilities. In terms of case A (Table 1), the predicted probability is obtained
as follows:
Pˆj|j>0 =
ex
′
j βˆ∑J
i=1 e
x′iβˆ
, (18)
while for case B (Table 2), there are three predicted probabilities to be computed:
Pˆj|j>0,s =
ex
′
sj βˆ∑J
i=1 e
x′siβˆ
, (19)
Pˆs|j =
ex
′
sj βˆ∑S
r=1 e
x′rj βˆ
, and (20)
Pˆj|j>0 =
∑S
r=1 e
x′rj βˆ∑S
r=1
∑J
i=1 e
x′riβˆ
. (21)
3.2 An example
By way of an illustration, we take the data on location choices in Portugal by foreign-owned
plants used in Guimaraes et al. (2000, 2003), and we report the elasticities implied by the
coefficients of their regression model. The data cover a cross section of 758 location choices
among 275 Portuguese regions by firms belonging to one of 151 industries.10 Their region-
industry level regressor of main interest, xsjk, is “industry-specific agglomeration”, defined as
10We follow GFW by referring to industry-year pairs as “industries”. The 151 industries in their data set
are combinations of 27 three-digit manufacturing sectors and seven sample years, ranging from 1985 to 1991.
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Table 3: Comparing implied elasticities in an example of case B
large region j small region j
CL Poisson CL Poisson
Region-industry specific regressor xsjk:
(a) ∂ logE(nsj)∂xsjk 2.9290 3.1883 3.18778 3.18832
(b) ∂ logE(nsi)∂xsjk -0.2593 0 -0.00054 0
(c) ∂ logE(ns)∂xsjk 0 0.2593 0 0.00054
(d) ∂ logE(nj)∂xsjk 0.1110 0.1208 0.09624 0.09626
(e) ∂ logE(ni)∂xsjk -0.0095 0 -0.00002 0
(f) ∂ logE(n)∂xsjk 0 0.0106 0 0.00002
Region specific regressor xjk:
(g) ∂ logE(nj)∂xjk 0.3873 0.42577 0.42548 0.42577
(h) ∂ logE(ni)∂xjk -0.0378 0 -0.00004 0
(i) ∂ logE(n)∂xjk 0 0.0374 0 0.00010
Notes: large region: j = Lisbon; small region: j = Oleiros; i = Porto in
rows (e) and (h); k = “industry-specific agglomeration” in rows (a) to
(f), k = “total manufacturing agglomeration” in rows (g) to (i); sector:
s = ISIC 351 (Industrial Chemicals) in 1989 in rows (a) to (f); any sector
in rows (g) to (i).
the share of regional employment in the same industry as the relevant firm. Their region level
regressor of main interest, xjk, is “total manufacturing agglomeration”, defined as the log of
aggregate manufacturing employment per square kilometer.
Taking their estimated parameters and computing the empirical probabilities (18)-(21),
we can calculate all the implied elasticities of Table 2. Since the probabilities (18)-(21) vary
by region and industry, we need to select specific cases for the computation of elasticities. We
provide illustrations for two base regions j: Lisbon, the largest region in terms of Pˆj|j>0, and
Oleiros, the smallest region in terms of Pˆj|j>0 that still had non-zero firm counts in the larger
industry considered.11
Table 3 shows the implied elasticities for changes in a region-industry specific regressor
and in a region specific regressor. We can take these estimates to illustrate Observations
2 to 4.
• Observation 2: Own-region elasticities are larger in the Poisson model than in the
11Where a comparison region i needs to be specified for the computation of cross elasticities, we choose
Porto, the second largest region in the data set. Where an industry s needs to be specified, we choose
Industrial Chemicals (ISIC 351) in 1989, the largest sector-year pair in the dataset (31 observed choices, i.e. 4
percent of the total of 758 choices).
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conditional logit (rows (a), (d) and (g)). We can see that the difference between implied
own-region elasticities is non-trivial for the large region (some 10 percent) but very small
for the small region (less than 0.1 percent). This illustrates that the difference between
implied own-region elasticities of the two models vanishes as the number of regions grows
large and individual regions therefore become small.
• Observation 3: All Poisson cross-region elasticities are zero (rows (b), (e) and (h)).
• Observation 4: In the conditional logit model, the total number of firms (across all of
Portugal) is invariant to changes in the values of xsjk or xjk whereas in the Poisson
model the total changes with xsjk or xjk (rows (c), (f) and (i)). The effect on the total
number of firms of a given change in xsjk is stronger if the change occurs in a large
region.
These computations illustrate the qualitatively different predictions implied by the condi-
tional logit and Poisson models. With J = 275 spatial alternatives and s = 151 industries,
the underlying data set is highly disaggregated, implying relatively modest quantitative dif-
ferences between implied elasticities. Nonetheless, even here some of the differences are far
from negligible. Perhaps the most striking difference appears in row (c) of Table 3. A one-unit
change in xsjk of Lisbon leaves the number of Portuguese plants in industry s unchanged in
the conditional logit framework, while it increases by up to 29 percent in the Poisson model.
Policy makers ought not to ignore a difference of such magnitude.
4 Conclusions
We show that the three standard location choice models - conditional logit, nested logit and
Poisson - are observationally equivalent in terms of cross-section estimation yet imply starkly
different predictions.
Take a corporate tax cut in a particular region. Provided that this is perceived by firms
as making that region more attractive, all three models imply that the region itself will see an
increase in its number of firms. We show that the magnitude of the implied increase differs:
it is largest if the world is properly represented by the Poisson model, smallest if the world
conforms with the conditional logit, and somewhere in-between if the world is nested logit. In
a Poisson world, the tax cut will have no impact on firm counts in any other of regions within
the data set. It will, however, pull firms away from other regions in the conditional logit and
the nested logit cases. As the total number of firms is fixed in the conditional logit, the sum
of the firms pulled away from the other regions is the same as the increase in the number
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of firms in the tax-cutting region itself. The nested logit again represents an intermediate
case, with some of the attracted firms relocating from elsewhere within the data set, implying
that regional corporate tax bases are “rival”; and some firms appearing from outside that
set, implying a “non-rival” tax base. The same logic can be applied to residential choices of
private households with respect, for instance, to changes in local property tax rates.
Empirical researchers should be aware of the interpretational ambiguity affecting estimated
parameters in standard location choice models, particularly if the number of locations and
industries distinguished in the data is small. It can therefore be useful to report both condi-
tional logit and Poisson elasticity estimates as bounds on the effects implied by the estimated
parameters.
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Appendix: Derivations for case B
Grouped conditional logit
The conditional logit model for grouped data is given by the probability that a given firm f
of industry s chooses region j
Pj|f = Pj|s =
ex
′
sjβ∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ
.
The log likelihood function is
logL(β) =
S∑
s=1
J∑
j=1
NsjPj|s =
S∑
s=1

J∑
j=1
Nsjx
′
sjβ −
J∑
j=1
[Nsj log
J∑
i=1
ex
′
siβ]
 .
The expected number of firms in region j and industry s is
E(nsj) = nsPj|s =
nse
x′sjβ∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ
.
and the corresponding own-region and cross-region elasticities within industry s are, respec-
tively,
∂ logE(nsj)
∂xsjk
= (1− Pj|s)βk,
∂ logE(nsi)
∂xsjk
= −Pj|sβk.
The expected number of firms in industry s is
E(ns) =
J∑
j=1
E(nsj) = ns = Ns,
and the corresponding elasticity within industry s is
∂ logE(ns)
∂xsjk
= 0.
The expected number of firms in region j is
E(nj) =
S∑
s=1
E(nsj) =
S∑
s=1
nsPj|s =
S∑
s=1
nse
x′sjβ∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ
.
The corresponding own-region and cross-region elasticities are for a region-industry specific
shock xsjk are
∂ logE(nj)
∂xsjk
=
∂ logE(nsj)
∂xsjk
· E(nsj)
E(nj)
= (1− Pj|s)Ps|jβk,
∂ logE(ni)
∂xsjk
=
∂ logE(nsi)
∂xsjk
· E(nsi)
E(ni)
= −Pj|sPs|iβk,
where Ps|j = E(nsj)/E(nj).
The own-region and cross-region elasticities for a region-specific shock xjk are
∂ logE(nj)
∂xjk
=
S∑
s=1
[
∂ logE(nsj)
∂xjk
· E(nsj)
E(nj)
]
= βk
S∑
s=1
(1− Pj|s)Ps|j ,
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∂ logE(ni)
∂xjk
=
S∑
s=1
[
∂ logE(nsi)
∂xjk
· E(nsi)
E(ni)
]
= −βk
S∑
s=1
Pj|sPs|i.
The expected total number of firms in all regions and industries is
E(n) =
S∑
s=1
J∑
j=1
E(njs) =
S∑
s=1
E(ns) = n,
and the corresponding elasticities for a region-industry specific shock xsjk and a region-specific
shock xjk are, respectively,
∂ logE(n)
∂xsjk
= 0,
∂ logE(n)
∂xjk
= 0.
Grouped Poisson
The Poisson model for grouped data is given as
E(nsj) = λsj = eαs+x
′
sjβ,
where αs is an industry-specific constant. The concentrated log likelihood function is
logL(β) =
S∑
s=1

J∑
j=1
Nsjx
′
iβ −
J∑
j=1
[Nsj log(
J∑
i=1
ex
′
siβ)]−
J∑
j=1
logNsj ! +Ns logNs
−N.
The share of firms in region j for any given industry s is given by
Pj|s =
E(nsj)∑J
i=1E(nsj)
=
eαs+x
′
sjβ∑J
i=1 e
αs+x′siβ
=
ex
′
sjβ∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ
.
The own-region and cross-region elasticities within industry s are, respectively,
∂ logE(nsj)
∂xsjk
= βk,
∂ logE(nsi)
∂xsjk
= 0.
The expected number of firms in industry s is
E(ns) =
J∑
i=1
E(nsi) =
J∑
i=1
eαs+x
′
siβ =
J∑
i=1
E(nsi) =
J∑
i=1
eαs+x
′
siβ = eαs
J∑
i=1
ex
′
siβ,
and the corresponding elasticity within industry s is
∂ logE(ns)
∂xsjk
=
ex
′
sj∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ
βk = Pj|sβk.
The expected number of firms in region j is
E(nj) =
S∑
s=1
E(nsj) =
S∑
s=1
eαs+x
′
siβ.
The corresponding own-region and cross-region elasticities for a region-industry specific shock
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xsjk are
∂ logE(nj)
∂xsjk
=
∂ logE(nsj)
∂xsjk
· E(nsj)
E(nj)
= Ps|jβk,
∂ logE(ni)
∂xsjk
=
∂ logE(nsi)
∂xsjk
· E(nsi)
E(ni)
= 0,
where Ps|j = E(nsj)/E(nj).
The own-region and cross-region elasticities for a region-specific shock xjk are
∂ logE(nj)
∂xjk
=
S∑
s=1
[
∂ logE(nsj)
∂xjk
· E(nsj)
E(nj)
]
= βk,
∂ logE(ni)
∂xjk
=
S∑
s=1
[
∂ logE(nsi)
∂xjk
· E(nsi)
E(ni)
]
= 0.
The expected total number of firms in all regions and industries is
E(n) =
S∑
s=1
J∑
j=1
E(njs) =
S∑
s=1
E(ns) =
S∑
s=1
[
eαs
J∑
i=1
ex
′
siβ
]
,
and the corresponding elasticities for a region-industry specific shock xsjk and a region-specific
shock xjk are, respectively,
∂ logE(n)
∂xsjk
=
∂ logE(nsj)
∂xsjk
· E(nsj)
E(n)
= Ps|jPjβk,
∂ logE(n)
∂xjk
=
∂ logE(nj)
∂xjk
· E(nj)
E(n)
= Pjβk,
where Pj = E(nj)/E(n).
Grouped nested logit
The nested logit model for grouped data is given by the probability that firm f of industry s
chooses the outside option j = 0 or region j > 0 :
P0|s =
eδs
eδs + (
∑J
j=1 e
x′sjγ/λ)λ
=
eδs
eδs + (
∑J
j=1 e
x′sjβ)λ
,
Pj|s =
ex
′
sjβ(
∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ)λ−1
eδs + (
∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ)λ
= Pj>0|s · Pj|j>0,s = (1− P0|s)Pj|j>0,s,
where δs is an industry-specific constant, β = γ/λ and
Pj|j>0,s =
ex
′
sjβ∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ
.
The concentrated log likelihood function is
logL(β) =
S∑
s=1

J∑
j=1
Nsjx
′
sjβ −
J∑
j=1
[Nsj log
J∑
i=1
ex
′
siβ]
+ Ns0 log(Ns0) +Ns log(Ns)− (Ns +Ns0) log(Ns +Ns0)} .
The expected number of firms in domestic region j > 0 and industry s is
E(nsj) = (ns + ns0)Pj|s = (ns + ns0)(1− P0|s)Pj|j>0,s,
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and the corresponding own-region and cross-region elasticities within industry s are, respec-
tively,
∂ logE(nsj)
∂xsjk
= [1− Pj|j>0,s(1− λP0|s)]βk,
∂ logE(nsi)
∂xsjk
= −Pj|j>0,s(1− λP0|s)βk.
The expected number of all domestic firms in industry s is
E(ns) =
J∑
j=1
E(nsj) = (ns + ns0)(1− P0|s),
and the corresponding elasticity within industry s is
∂ logE(ns)
∂xsjk
= λP0|sPj|j>0,sβk.
The expected number of firms in domestic region j is
E(nj) =
S∑
s=1
E(nsj) =
S∑
s=1
(ns + ns0)Pj|s.
The corresponding own-region and cross-region elasticities for a region-industry specific shock
xsjk are
∂ logE(nj)
∂xsjk
=
∂ logE(nsj)
∂xsjk
· E(nsj)
E(nj)
= [1− Pj|j>0,s(1− λP0|s)]Ps|jβk,
∂ logE(ni)
∂xsjk
=
∂ logE(nsi)
∂xsjk
· E(nsi)
E(ni)
= −Pj|j>0,s(1− λP0|s)Ps|iβk,
where Ps|j = E(nsj)/E(nj).
The own-region and cross-region elasticities for a region-specific shock xjk are
∂ logE(nj)
∂xjk
=
S∑
s=1
[
∂ logE(nsj)
∂xjk
· E(nsj)
E(nj)
]
= βk
S∑
s=1
[1− Pj|j>0,s(1− λP0|s)]Ps|j ,
∂ logE(ni)
∂xjk
=
S∑
s=1
[
∂ logE(nsi)
∂xjk
· E(nsi)
E(ni)
]
= −βk
S∑
s=1
Pj|j>0,s(1− λP0|s)Ps|i.
The expected total number of firms in all domestic regions and industries is
E(n) =
S∑
s=1
J∑
j=1
E(njs) =
J∑
j=1
E(nj),
and the corresponding elasticities for a region-industry specific shock xsjk and a region-specific
shock xjk are, respectively,
∂ logE(n)
∂xsjk
=
∂ logE(nsj)
∂xsjk
+
∑
i 6=j,i>0
∂ logE(nsi)
∂xsjk
 · E(nsj)
E(n)
= βkλP0|sPs|jPj ,
∂ logE(n)
∂xjk
=
∂ logE(nj)
∂xjk
+
∑
i 6=j,i>0
∂ logE(ni)
∂xjk
 · E(nj)
E(n)
= βkPj
S∑
s=1
(λP0|sPs|j),
where Pj = E(nj)/E(n).
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